While most Americans now accept the scientific reality of human-caused climate change, the public policy debate in the United States remains deeply polarized and dysfunctional. One political faction frames it as an existential crisis demanding immediate, drastic action, while the other dismisses it as a secondary concern that threatens economic growth. Economists, ostensibly trained to analyze trade-offs, have ironically helped fuel these extremes. High-profile economic models that project global climate damages centuries into the future—with estimates ranging from modest to catastrophic—lend a veneer of scientific authority to arguments for both complacency and alarm. These studies are frequently cited selectively to justify pre-existing political agendas, despite being far too limited and uncertain to definitively support either extreme position.
The political weaponization of climate economics is evident. Opponents of aggressive policy, such as the Trump administration, have pointed to the work of Nobel laureate William Nordhaus, whose models show relatively modest economic damages and high costs of mitigation, to argue for limited action. His „optimal” pathway, which aligns with over 3°C of warming by 2100, has been used to validate inaction, despite Nordhaus’s own support for policies like a carbon tax. Conversely, climate advocates have cited studies projecting catastrophic economic losses—like a now-retracted paper suggesting a 20-60% reduction in per capita income by 2100—to justify climate action at almost any cost, including halting new fossil-fuel infrastructure. These polarized uses present a false binary, ignoring the broad consensus among economists for balanced policies like carbon pricing that reduce emissions with minimal economic disruption.
The core issue is that policymakers demand precise, quantitative damage estimates to conduct cost-benefit analyses, but such long-term, aggregated global projections lie far beyond the discipline’s credible analytical capabilities. Small, subjective changes in assumptions about future damages, adaptation, or economic growth can yield wildly different results, effectively allowing modelers to produce conclusions that align with either a pessimistic or optimistic worldview. As the late economist Martin Weitzman warned, presenting these speculative figures as „accurate and objective” overstates what economics can deliver and degrades public discourse. The estimates are deeply uncertain and can be arbitrarily inaccurate.
A more constructive discussion requires greater intellectual humility about the limits of economic forecasting. Experts must be clearer about what these models can do—such as identifying concentrated risks and efficient policy tools—and what they cannot: providing definitive, precise valuations of climate impacts over centuries. Acknowledging that the full effects of climate change are ultimately unknowable would make it harder to treat speculative damage estimates as decisive evidence for unsupportable claims. Moving beyond a false sense of precision is essential to elevate the debate and focus on managing profound uncertainties and risks, rather than pretending they can be eliminated with a single number.
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Forrás: https://www.theatlantic.com/science/2026/01/climate-economics/685609/.